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Abstract 
Based on the Agency literature, on the one hand, cash dividends paid to shareholders reduce free cash flows and 
reduce the risk of investment in non-optimal investing projects, and on the other hand, increase constant control 
on managers by capital markets. Accordingly, interest payments as a policy maker-works to reduce conflict of 
interest. Hence, this study is about the survey of effect of mechanisms of Corporate Governance on the dividend 
policy of the companies accepted by the Tehran Stock Exchange. Four hypotheses represented to test this effect. 
The population of this study involves all listed companies of the Tehran Stock Exchange. Taking consideration 
the limitations of the sample of the present study, 71 companies selected as the sample of this study. The present 
study discusses mentioned companies from 2009 to 2013. The methodology of this study involves using the past 
information. Using statistical methods ,regression analysis using combined data by fixed- effects. 
The obtained results of this study are indicative that is not a meaningful relation between the mechanisms of 
Corporate Governance and the rate of dividend. 
Keywords: Corporate governance, outside boards, institutional ownership, and agency theory. 
 
1. Introduction 
Corporate governance is one of the main issues which has been considered by researchers in recent years after 
widespread financial scandals in big companies, and is considered as a significant subject for investors. 
Corporate governance thinks to the necessity of supervision on company management, and separates the 
economic unit from ownership, and subsequently preserves the rights of investors and beneficiaries. On the other 
hand, cash dividend policy has absorbed many studies in financial and accounting tasks; but no answers has been 
found so far for this question that why companies divide their intersts, or why investors pay attention to dividend 
policy. This is known as “dividend puzzle” in finance (Adaglu, 2000). 
The main infrastructure of both research groups is related to information asymmetry between managers and 
beneficiaries and agency relationship between managers and stock holders. Jensen & Mc Ling, after explaining 
the agency cost which is a result of inequality in information among managers and stock holders, express that 
one of the mechanisms for reducing these costs is to reduce free cash flow available for managers, which is 
obtained through interest payment (Komar, 2006). Dividend reduces agency cost through distribution of free 
cash flow, which is invested in unprofitable projects by manager (kovaleski, 2007). Therefore; according to 
agency theory, it is often expected that managers perform activities which are costly for stock holders, even the 
signed contracts between managers and companies can not prevent opportunistic activities of managers. So, 
stock holders without control, require a structure for supervision. Corporate governance is a tool for creating 
balance between stock holders and management, and reduces agency problems, it also reduces this possibility 
that managers follow a dividend policy which is lower than desired level. So, it is expected that corporate 
governance mechanisms affect dividend policy (Pronzit, 2004). Considering above mentioned issues, this 
question arises that whether there is a significant relationship between dividend policy and corporate governance 
mechanisms in Iranian companies. In general, overal goals of present research is summurized as below: 
1. Determining the impact of institutional ownership on the level of interest payment; 
2. Determining the impact of managerial ownership on the level of interest payment; 
3. Determining the impact of outside boards on the level of interest payment, and 
4. Determining the impact of duality of board`s chairman on the level of interest payment. 
 
2. Theoratical principles and Research history 
The main goal of stock companies is to maximize the wealth of stock holders. One of the effective factors of this 
issue is the company dividend policy. Hence, dividend policy has always been one of the most significant 
financial issues; because, divided interest is considered as an indicator of major cash payments of companies, 
and one of the most important items in managers` desicion-makings. Manager should decide that how much of 
company`s  interest is divided and how much of  it is reinvested in company in the form of retained earnings 
(Baker & Powell, 2005). Moreover, this policy has information content in stock market, and changing it involves 
information for stock holders. Each stock holder buys a company`s stocks which its dividend policy is 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.5, No.23, 2014 
 
154 
determined as desirable. The level of stock interest proposed by board usually involves information about 
managers` expectations regarding future profitability of company (Jahan Khani & Parsaeiyan, 2005). 
Dividend policy is one of the most significant issues in financing literature of companies. Many researchers have 
provided theoratical principles and empirical evidence relevant to dividend policy criteria. Nevertheless, 
dividend policy issue is left unsolved and no specific guideline is created about optimal dividend policy (Naceur 
et al, 2006). However, corporations usually follow a specified dividend policy. Different factors such as, policies 
being used in similar companies, previous dividend policy, legal limitations, and profitability stability, are 
considered when codifying this policy. Despite there are multiple policies, companies often use policies 
including dividing a fixed and certain amounts, dividing a fixed percentage of interest, dividing fixed interest 
along with variable margin, and dividing the excess interest. (Baker & Powel, 2005; Jahan Khani & Parsaeiyan, 
2005). 
Based on agency theory, there are two hypotheses when explaining dividend in financial literature: 1) outcome 
hypothesis, 2) replacement hypothesis. Outcome hypothesis is based on free cash flow hypothesis. According to 
free cash flow hypothesis, opportunist managers invest  free cash in projects which increase their reputations 
(Mitton, 2004). Outcome hypothesis argue that dividend is an outcome of quality of corporate governance. In 
fact, companies which do not preserve the rights of stock holders, develop opportunistic managements, because 
in such companies managers possess a widespread power and stock holders do not supervise their activities 
adequately. In this case, managers try to maintain cash in company instead of distributing it among stock 
holders. So, lower interest payment is a result of weak corporate governance. But if stock holders possess power, 
they can affect the dividend (Blau, 2008). 
Replacement hypothesis is another hypothesis when explaining interest distribution. Based on this hypothesis, 
the rights of stock holders is replaced by dividend. that is; companies with weaker governance, pay more 
dividend, so that it is a substitude for their weak management. This issue especially focuses on companies` needs 
for external financing through outside investment markets. Companies should have an acceptable credit for 
external financing, and one of the ways to obtain such a credit is to pay stock interest. Therefore, stock interest 
payment is the biggest achievement for such companies. Ofcourse, if companies have a powerful corporate 
structure, the need to credit mechanisms and payment of stock interst by them, will be decreased (Mitton, 2004). 
Previous studies support the presence of replacement relation between dividend and the level of corporate 
governance (companies with weaker corporate governance, pay more dividend to their stock holders). In fact, 
more payment encourages the stock holders to invest in company. Since, companies` financing in Iran often is 
done through loans and stocks, and it is important for them to obtain credit; more cash interest is paid in 
companies in which the stock holders` rights are weak, and investors may be recommended to pay enough 
attention to corporate governance level beside dividend policy, when forming their portpolio; becuase 
opportunistic managers use dividend as  a tool to cover their weak corporate governance (Fakhari & Yousef 
Alitabar, 2010). 
Zeckhauser & Pound (1990) argued that institutional stock holders force the companies to pay more dividend. 
They prefer to pay stock interest instead of maintaining  cash, becuase individuals within organization may waste 
this amount of free cash flow. In other words, stock holders make the managers to distribute more interest, in 
order to prevent wasting of surplus funds and also to reduce agency costs. So according to this theory, as 
institutional ownership increases, demands for more interest payment increase as well. Zeckhauser & Pound 
(1990) express that they may look at stock interests and institutional stock holders as a tool for signalling. The 
presence of big stock holders may result in decrease in using stock interest as a signal for approperiate 
performance of company, becuase these investors are a reliable sign (even more reliable than stock interest). 
According to this viewpoint, there is a negative relationship between institutional ownership and payable sotck 
interest, and as institutional ownership increases, payable stock interest decreases. It may indicate that 
institutional sotck holders prefer to maintain cash in company rather than distributing it as stock. The research 
findings are consistent with works by Baclay et al (2006) and Zeckhauser (1990). 
So, considering the ambiguity which exists in the impact of different corporate governance mechanisms on 
dividend policy of companies, this research has reviewed this issue. 
Theoratical model of present research is shown below: 
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A number of domestic and foreign researches which are somehow related to this research, are presented below: 
Findings of research of Jiraporn et al. (2011) indicated that as the guality of corporate governance mechanisms 
increases, normal intention of companies to enhance interest payment increases. 
AlNajjar et al. (2009) reviewed the relationship between interest payment ratio and percentage of outside board 
members. The results indicated that percentage of outside board members has a negative and significant 
relationship with interest payment. 
Chae et al. (2009) indicated that companies with more effective corporate governance and higher foreign 
financing limitations, pay lower stock interest, while companies with weaker corporate governance and lower 
foreign financing limitations, pay more stock interest. 
Pronzit et al. (2009) indicated that there is a positive relationship between the quality of corporate governance 
dividend. These results do not change after controlling the company`s features such as size, profitability, tax 
effect and growth opportunities. 
Abdelsalam et al. (2008) indicated that there is a significant relationship between institutional ownership and 
cash interest payment. Despite this, no significant relationship was seen between board combination and cash 
interest payment. 
Kawalewski & Talavera (2007) in a research performed about 110 non-financial companies listed in Poland 
stock exchange, concluded that centralized stock ownership and Deviation from the principle of one share of the 
vote resulted in decrease in stock interest payment. Moreover, the results support free cash flow hypothesis, but 
interest signalling hypothesis has a lower impact in this country. 
The results of a research by Kumar (2006) indicate that institutional ownership has a negative and significant 
relationship with interest payment ratio. 
Belden et al. (2005) reviewed the impact of outside board members on interest payment, and decrease in agency 
costs. The results indicated that as the members of outside board in board combination increase, cash interest 
payment level increases. 
Bebczuk (2005) believes that if corporate governance mechanisms in company are better, stock interest payment 
will be more.  
Desh Much (2003) reviewed dividend policy dynamism through a random model, and concluded that dividend 
has a reverse relationship with inequality level of information and investment opportunity growth, and it has a 
direct relationship with cash flow level. 
Short et al. (2002) in English companies indicated that bigger management ownership means lower stock interest 
payment level; while bigger institutional ownership is related to higher stock insterest payment. They interpreted 
that their results support free cash flow hypothesis. 
Forughi et al. (2009) reviewed the level and quality of effectiveness of institutional stock holders (ownership 
structure type) and managerial stocks (association level of stock holders in company management) on company 
dividend policy. The results indicated that the level of managerial stocks of company has a positive and 
significant relationship with dividend policy. The results of a research by Sharif et al. (2009) also indicated that 
the ownership level of the biggest stock holder, ownership amount of 5 big stock holders, and ownership 
percentage of institutional stockholders, have a positive impact on company interest payment. The results of a 
research by Setayesh et al. (2010) indicated that corporate ownership and independency of board have positive 
impact, and institutional ownership has a negative impact on interest payment level of companies being 
reviewed. However, the findings of their research include no evidence about any significant relationship between 
managerial ownership and ownership focus level with dividend policy. 
Khajavi et al. (2011) reviewed internal and external supervisory mechanisms on dividend policy. The results 
indicated that there is a negative and insignificant relationship between percentage of outside board members 
Corporate 
governance 
mechanisms 
Dividend policy 
of companies 
Financila leverage, 
sales growth, company 
size, and numer of 
years that company is 
listed in stock 
exchange 
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with cash interest payment level, and there is a positive and insignificant relationship between percentage of 
institutional ownership with cash interest payment level. 
 
3. Reseach hypotheses 
Main hypothesis 
Corporate governance mechanisms have impacts on stock interest payment. 
Secondary hypotheses 
1) ownership percentage of stocks of company managers has impacts on stock interest payment to stock holders 
in companies listed in Tehran stock exchange. 
2) institutional ownership has impacts on stock interest payment to stock holders in companies listed in Tehran 
stock exchange. 
3) percentage of outside boar memebrs have impacts on stock interest payment to stock holders in companies 
listed in Tehran stock exchange. 
4) the presence of one of outside board memebrs has impacts on stock interest payment to stock holders in 
companies listed in Tehran stock exchange. 
4. Research variables 
Research variables have been divided into 3 groups in order to test the hypotheses: dependent, independent and 
control variables. 
4.1. Independent variable 
Managerial ownership and institutional ownership are introduced as ownership structure components, and 
outside boards and duality are introduced as board structure. 
Institutional ownership is defined as stocks of big stock holders such as banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds, investment companies, and other state companies (Boshi, 1998). This variable has been used with the 
same concept  in works performed by Charu et al. (2005), Long & Sahu (2008), and ElSayd (2010). 
Outside boards are defined as those who are a part time members of board, and they have no fixed salary 
(Ghaemi & Shahriari, 2009). The same definition is used in works performed by Atmaja et al. (2009), Li Hen et 
al. (2009), Chaizma & Kim (2010), Hi & Sumer (2010), and Patan & Oskoli (2010). 
Duality of board`s chairman is defined as a planar variable which if one of the board members is the chairman of 
the board, it is equal to 1, unless it is equal to 0. The same definition has been used in works performed by Lasfer 
(2004), Danelli & Keli (2005), and Lasfer (2006). 
4.2. Dependent variable 
in this research, cash dividend to sale ratio is determined as dividend policy. 
4.3. Control variable 
Control variables used in present research as other effective factors on dividend policy, include: 
1. financial leverage (long-term debts to total assets). 
2. sale growth rate (SG) (difference in sales in a certain year and previous year is divided to sales in pervious 
year). 
3. company size (company assets logarithm) 
4. the number of the years a company is listed in Tehran stok exchange (Listing Years). 
5. Research population and statistical sample 
Population of this research includes total companies listed in Tehran stock exchange in 2007-2011 time period. 
Through screening method, only the companies which have had below qualifications have been selectd as 
statistical samples: 
1. their financial year ends in March. 
2. they have not changed their financial year during research period. 
3. they have provided all the required financial information in 2007-2011 time period. 
4. they are not investment company, banks, or financial intermediates. 
According to above mentioned qualifications, a number of 71 companies were selected and reviewed as sample. 
6. Research method and data collection 
Since this research is going to determine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (ownership 
structure and board structure) and dividend policy of companies, it is a correlation research, and since 
determinatio on such a relationship may be useful to those who use financial information of the companies, it is 
an applied research. after-event method is used when researcher reviews the issue after the event has happened, 
and also when manipulation of independent variables is impossible (Reshad quoted by Namazi, 2000). 
In this research, data collection is performed by refering to financial statements, explanatory notes, weekly 
reports and journal of stock exchange, and through using Rah Avard Novin and Tadbir Pardaz softwares. 
7. Data analysis method and testing the hypotheses 
This research reviews the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and dividend policy through 
polled/panel regression analysis, as below: 
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 =  + 
 +  +  +  +  +  +  +   + ! 
 
In which, we have: 
"#$%&= dividend policy of company i at the end of financial year t 
'(%&= managerial ownership of company i at the end of financial year t 
#(%&= institutional ownership of company i at the end of financial year t 
()*+= outside boards of company i at the end of financial year t 
",-.%&/%&= duality of company i at the end of financial year t 
01$%&= financial leverage of company i at the end of financial year t 
23%&= sales growth of company i at the end of financial year t 
2#41%&= size of company i at the end of financial year t 
05%&= listing years of company i at the end of financial year t 
6%&= regression residuals of company i at the end of financial year t. 
Mergering time and sectional series data (pooled data) and the necessity to use it, is mainly to increase visits 
number, raise freedom degree, decrease the anisotropy of variance and decrease the linearity among variables. 
Before estimation of regression models to test the research hypotheses, an approperiate pattern is selected for 
regression model. First, pooled data will be chosen against panel data through F-Limer test. If F-Limer 
possibility value is less than significant level of 5%, using pooled data model is ruled out. Unless using pooled 
data model is approperiate. 
If pooled data model is not chosen against panel data model, Hasman test is used to select fixed effects pattern of 
panel data against random fixed effects pattern of panel data. If Hasman possibility value is less than significant 
level of 5%, we have no enough evidence to reject fixed effects pattern, and this pattern should be used to test 
this hypothesis. Unless, if significant level is more than 5%, using random fixed pattern is approperiate. 
In all statistical techniques, EXCEL and Eviews are used. 
8. Research data analysis 
8.1. Review of descriptive statistics of Research variables 
Descriptive statistics of research variables are presented in table 1. 
The results indicate that dividend to sales ratio of companies being reviewed has been 74.5% on average, and the 
level of institutional ownership and managerial ownership has been 42.4% and 11.5% on average, respectively. 
Sales growth of companies being reviewed has been 15.2%. moreover, their financial leverage has been equal to 
8.2% on average. 
 
Table 1. descriptive statistics of research variables 
Variable  No.  Average  Maximum Minimum Standard deviation 
Dividend policy 355  0.103 0.745 0.000 0.126 
Managerial ownership 355  0.115 0.650 0.000 0.186 
Institutional ownership 355  0.424 0.980 0.000 0.335 
Outside boards 355  0.447 1.000 0.000 0.243 
Duality 355  0.355 1.000 0.000 0.479 
Company size 355  5.894 7.795 4.562 0.580 
Listing years 355  34.278 58.000 8.000 11.154 
Sales growth 355  0.152 2.031 -0.726 0.296 
Financial leverage 355  0.081 0.555 0.000 0.093 
 
2.8. Testing the first secondary hypothesis 
 
The first secondary hypothesis: managerial ownership of companies has effects on stock interst payments to 
stock holders in companies listed in Tehran stock exchange 
Before testing above hypothesis, an approperiate pattern has been selected for regression model. First, pooled 
data model is selected against plan data model through F-Limer test. The results of F-Limer test are shown in 
table 2. F test possibility in table 2 is less than significant level of 5%, so using pooled data model for testing 
above hypothesis is ruled out. 
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Table 2. selecting pooled data model against plan data model 
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +   + ! Model  
Test possibility  Test value  Test type  
0.000  10.48  F-Limer  
 
Since pooled data model is not selected against plan data model, Hasman test has been performed to select fixed 
effects pattern against plan random effects pattern. The results of Hasman test are shown in table 3. Hasman test 
possibility in table 3 is less than significant level of 5%, so there is no enough reason to reject fixed effects 
pattern and this pattern is used to test the first secondary hypothesis. 
 
Table 3. selecting fixed effects pattern against random effects pattern 
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +   + ! Model  
Test possibility  Freedom degree  Test value  Test type  
0.037  5  11.84  Hasman  
 
Plan regression model of fixed effects pattern of impact of managerial ownership on the level of stock interest 
payment to stock holders, shown in table 4, indicates that the impact of managerial ownership on the level of 
stock interest payment to stock holders is positive (0.14) but according to t test possibility it is not significant 
(0.431). it indicates that managerial ownership has no effect on the level of stock interest payment to stock 
holders. 
The results also indicate that, company growth and listing years have negative impacts on stock interest payment 
to stock holders. 
The results regarding F test indicate that the model is generally significant and according to Doorbin-Watson 
test, it has no self-correlation problem. 
Moreover, the results regarding adjusted determination coefficient indicate that about 0.66 of policy of interest 
payment to stock holders has been affected by research variables specially company growth and listing years. 
Since the impact of managerial ownership on the level of interest payment to stock holders is not significant, the 
first secondary hypothesis is not confirmed. 
 
Table 4. the effect of mnagerial ownership on the level of interest payment to stock holders 
Tests  
Variables  
Regression 
coefficients  
T test value T test possibility  
Fixed amount  0.23  0.88  0.381  
Managerial ownership  0.14  0.79  0.431  
Company size 0.04  0.82  0.411  
Listing years -0.01  -3.18  0.002  
Sales growth -0.06  -4.04  0.000  
Financial leverage 0.04  0.48  0.635  
Determination coefficient  Adjusted 
determination 
coefficient  
F test possibility  Doorbin-Watson 
test  
0.734  0.663  0.000  2.151  
 
8.3. Testing the second secondary hypothesis 
The second secondary hypothesis: institutional ownership has impcts on the level of interest payment to stock 
holders in companies listed in Tehran stock exchange 
Before testing above hypothesis, an approperiate pattern has been selected for regression model. The results of 
F-Limer test are shown in table 5. F test possibility in table 5 is less than significant level of 5%, so using pooled 
data model for testing above hypothesis is ruled out. 
 
Table 5. selecting pooled data model against plan data model 
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +   + ! Model  
Test possibility  Test value  Test type  
0.000  10.68  F-Limer  
 
The results of Hasman test are show in table 6. Te value of Hasman test possibility shown in table 6 is less than 
significant level of 5%, so there is no enough reason to reject fixed effects pattern, and this pattern is used to test 
the second secondary hypothesis. 
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Table 3. selecting fixed effects pattern against random effects pattern 
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +   + ! Model  
Test possibility  Freedom degree  Test value  Test type  
0.04  5  11.67  Hasman  
 
Plan regression model of fixed effects pattern of impact of institutional ownership on the level of stock interest 
payment to stock holders, shown in table 7, indicates that the impact of institutional ownership on the level of 
stock interest payment to stock holders is positive (0.11) but according to t test possibility it is not significant 
(0.088). it indicates that institutional ownership has no effect on the level of stock interest payment to stock 
holders. 
The results also indicate that, company growth and listing years have negative impacts on stock interest payment 
to stock holders. 
The results regarding adjusted determination coefficient indicate that about 0.67 of policy of interest payment to 
stock holders has been affected by research variables specially company growth and listing years. 
Since the impact of institutional ownership on the level of interest payment to stock holders is not significant, the 
second secondary hypothesis is not confirmed. 
  
Table 4. the effect of institutional ownership on the level of interest payment to stock holders 
Tests  
Variables  
Regression 
coefficients  
T test value T test possibility  
Fixed amount  0.26  1.04  0.307  
institutional ownership  0.11  1.71  0.088  
Company size 0.03  0.61  0.546  
Listing years -0.01  -3.17  0.002  
Sales growth -0.06  -4.09  0.000  
Financial leverage 0.02  0.27  0.791  
Determination coefficient  Adjusted 
determination 
coefficient  
F test possibility  Doorbin-Watson 
test  
0.736  0.665  0.0000  2.159  
 
8.4. Testing the third secondary hypothesis 
The third secondary hypothesis: outside boards has impacts on interest payment to stock holders in companies 
lised in Tehran stock exchange 
The results of F-Limer test are shown in table 8. F test possibility in table 8 is less than significant level of 5%, 
so using pooled data model for testing above hypothesis is ruled out. 
 
Table 8. selecting pooled data model against plan data model 
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +   + ! Model  
Test possibility  Test value  Test type  
0.000  10.64  F-Limer  
 
The results of Hasman test are show in table 9. The value of Hasman test possibility shown in table 9 is less than 
significant level of 5%, so there is no enough reason to reject fixed effects pattern, and this pattern is used to test 
the third secondary hypothesis. 
 
Table 9. selecting fixed effects pattern against random effects pattern 
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +   + ! Model  
Test possibility  Freedom degree  Test value  Test type  
0.045  5  11.356  Hasman  
 
Plan regression model of fixed effects pattern of impact of outside boards on the level of stock interest payment 
to stock holders, shown in table 10, indicates that the impact of outside bords on the level of stock interest 
payment to stock holders is negative (-0.01) but according to t test possibility it is not significant (0.672). it 
indicates that outside boards has no effect on the level of stock interest payment to stock holders. 
The results regarding adjusted determination coefficient indicate that about 0.66 of policy of interest payment to 
stock holders has been affected by research variables specially company growth and listing years. 
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Since the impact of outside boards on the level of interest payment to stock holders is not significant, the third 
secondary hypothesis is not confirmed. 
 
Table 10. the effect of outside boards on the level of interest payment to stock holders 
Tests  
Variables  
Regression 
coefficients  
T test value T test possibility  
Fixed amount  0.26  1.03  0.304  
Outside boards  -0.01  -0.43  0.672  
Company size 0.04  0.74  0.456  
Listing years -0.01  -3.12  0.002  
Sales growth -0.06  -4.07  0.000  
Financial leverage 0.04  0.45  0.651  
Determination coefficient  Adjusted 
determination 
coefficient  
F test possibility  Doorbin-Watson 
test  
0.733  0.662  0.0000  2.146  
 
8.5. Testing the fourth secondary hypothesis 
The fourth secondary hypothesis: duality of board`s chairman has impacts on interest payment to stock 
holders in companies lised in Tehran stock exchange 
The results of F-Limer test are shown in table 11. F test possibility in table 11 is less than significant level of 5%, 
so using pooled data model for testing above hypothesis is ruled out. 
 
Table 8. selecting pooled data model against plan data model 
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +   + ! Model  
Test possibility  Test value  Test type  
0.000  10.72  F-Limer  
 
The results of Hasman test are show in table 12. The value of Hasman test possibility shown in table 12 is less 
than significant level of 5%, so there is no enough reason to reject fixed effects pattern, and this pattern is used to 
test the fourth secondary hypothesis. 
 
Table 12. selecting fixed effects pattern against random effects pattern 
 =  + 
 +  +  +  +   + ! Model  
Test possibility  Freedom degree  Test value  Test type  
0.044  5  11.404  Hasman  
 
Plan regression model of fixed effects pattern of impact of duality of board`s chairman on the level of stock 
interest payment to stock holders, shown in table 13, indicates that the impact of duality of board`s chairman on 
the level of stock interest payment to stock holders is negative (-0.02) but according to t test possibility it is not 
significant (0.240). It indicates that duality of board`s chairman has no effect on the level of stock interest 
payment to stock holders. 
The results regarding adjusted determination coefficient indicate that about 0.66 of policy of interest payment to 
stock holders has been affected by research variables specially company growth and listing years. 
Since the impact of duality of board`s chairman on the level of interest payment to stock holders is not 
significant, the fourth secondary hypothesis is not confirmed. 
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Table 13. the effect of duality of board`s chairman on the level of interest payment to stock holders 
Tests  
Variables  
Regression 
coefficients  
T test value T test possibility  
Fixed amount  0.26  1.03  0.303  
Duality of board`s chairman   -0.02  -1.18  0.240  
Company size 0.04  0.78  0.439  
Listing years -0.01  -3.19  0.002  
Sales growth -0.06  -3.99  0.000  
Financial leverage 0.04  0.40  0.687  
Determination coefficient  Adjusted 
determination 
coefficient  
F test possibility  Doorbin-Watson 
test  
0.735  0.664  0.0000  2.136  
 
9. Discussions and recommendations 
The purpose of present research is to review the impact of corporate governance mechanisms (ownership 
structure and board structure) on dividend policy. A number of 71 companies were reviewed in 2007-2011 time 
period to perform this research. plan regression models of fixed effects have been used to test the research 
hypotheses. 
The results indicate that non of corporate governance mechanisms (ownership structure and board structure) 
have effects on dividend policy. 
The results also indicate that there is a negative and significant relationship between listing years and sales 
growth with cash dividend to sales ratio. It indicates that as sales growth and listing years of company increase, 
managers have no intention to increase interest payment, which is consistent with the research performed by 
Kovalaski & Talavra (2007). However, company size and non-current debts to total asets ratio have no 
significant impact on divident to sales ratio. Possibly, the reason of ineffectiveness of financial leverage gets 
back to financing structure of companies, which in Iran it is often done through banks. 
The results of this research about ineffectiveness of institutional ownership on dividend policy are consistent by 
previous researches done by Forughi et al. (2009), and Khajavi & Monfared (2011). 
According to research results, it seems that the role of institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and board 
structure in Tehran stock exchange in the field of cash dividend is very weak. So: 
1. Those who use financial information shuold be informed that presence of institutional stock holders, 
managerial ownership and outside boards, do not provide enough assurance for cash dividend. 
2. Considering that stock exchange may fluctuate in some years. So, it is recommended to investors to pay 
attention to these fluctuations, in order not to make mistake in their decisons. 
 
10. Recommendations for future studies 
On researcher`s opinion, there are still some issues in this regard that may be important for performing future 
researches. So, it is recommended to pay more attention to below recommendations to make optimal use of 
research results and also helping to clarification of the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on dividend 
policy of companies: 
1. Since there is another indexes for researches about corporate governance, it is recommended that future 
researches provide a comprehensive literature about corporate governance in Iran through reviewing the impact 
of these indexes on dividend policy. Audit committee, selection and appoinment committee, and reward 
committee, are examples of these indexes. 
2. To review the impact of  industry type on cash dividend policies of companies. 
3. To review the impact of other factors of corporate governance such as managers` employment years, 
managers` salaries, and independent audits` applying  years on dividend policy. 
4. To review the impact of great economic variables such as inflation, oil price and currency rate on the 
relationships between corporate governance and dividend policy of companies. 
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